7 research outputs found
Global Climate Change and the Funding of Adaptation
Mitigation and adaptation are the most important strategies in combating global climate change. It is expected that in a post Kyoto world industrialized countries have to engage in greenhouse gas abatement, and to support developing countries in adapting to climate change. Within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game we analyze, whether funding adaptation is incentive compatible in the sense that it stipulates mitigation. In particular it is the aim of this paper to discuss: (1) How does foreign funding of adaptation affect mitigation and regional welfare? (2) Under which conditions is it economically rational to fund adaptation in developing regions? We find that, if strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation exists, funding adaptation increases both global mitigation and the donors' welfare, but negatively affects the recipients' welfare. The later only benefit, if maladaptation or adaptation, which is neutral to mitigation, is funded, which, however, makes the donors worse off.Climate change; mitigation and adaptation; funding of private goods
Global Climate Change and the Funding of Adaptation
Mitigation and adaptation are the most important strategies in combating global climate change. It is expected that in a post Kyoto world industrialized countries have to engage in greenhouse gas abatement, and to support developing countries in adapting to climate change. Within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game we analyze, whether funding adaptation is incentive compatible in the sense that it stipulates mitigation. In particular it is the aim of this paper to discuss: (1) How does foreign funding of adaptation affect mitigation and regional welfare? (2) Under which conditions is it economically rational to fund adaptation in developing regions? We find that, if strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation exists, funding adaptation increases both global mitigation and the donors' welfare, but negatively affects the recipients' welfare. The later only benefit, if maladaptation or adaptation, which is neutral to mitigation, is funded, which, however, makes the donors worse off
To mitigate or to adapt: How to confront global climate change
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation and adaptation in a non-cooperative game in which regions are players and mitigation and adaptation are perfect substitutes in protecting against climate impacts. We allow for step by step decision making, with mitigation chosen first and adaptation second, and where the benefits of mitigation accrue only in the future. If marginal costs of adaptation decline with global mitigation, high income regions simultaneously invest in mitigation and adaptation. Low income regions engage in mitigation only.Climate change Mitigation and adaptation Public good with private substitutes